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BOOK REVIEWS 
Religion & Morality, by D.Z. Phillips. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1996. Pp. xix, 355. $54.95 (cloth). 
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, Trinity Graduate School and Trinity Law School, 
Trinity International University (Deerfield, IL), California campus. 
The relationship between religious belief and morality has been cen-
tral to philosophical reflection from the beginning in both Jerusalem 
and Athens. Consider the serpent's postmodern appeal to Eve's per-
sonal autonomy ("You will not surely die") and self-realization ("For 
God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you 
will be like God, knowing good and evil") as reasons for abandoning 
the restraints of religious dogma (i.e., God's command not to eat the 
fruit). In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks his young interlocator whether 
something is good because the gods love it or whether the gods love it 
because it is good. Although there have been numerous solutions 
offered for this apparent dilemma,1 it is clear that many other ques-
tions have since arisen, most of which can be traced back to both that 
Socratic dialogue as well as that conversation in Eden. 
Some of these suggestions addressed in Religion and Morality, edited 
by D.Z. Phillips. The contributions to this volume have their origin in 
papers delivered in February 1994 at the fifteenth annual conference 
on the philosophy of religion at the Claremont Graduate School. In 
addition to the book's introduction, Phillips authors a concluding 
essay ("Voices in Discussion") which is based on the notes he took on 
discussions among the conference participants between the presenta-
tions of the contributors' papers. It is a very helpful piece that guides 
the reader in drawing connections between the differing issues and 
perspectives published in the book. 
This book is divided into six parts, each of which contains two essays 
from authors who each take a point of view different from the other. 
Because all of these essays are rich and informative, I cannot possibly 
do justice to their contents in this review. For this reason, I will simply 
summarize the highlights of each while occasionally interjecting some 
comments here and there. 
In Part I, essays by Raimond Gaita ("Is Religion an Infantile 
Morality?") and Richard Schacht ("Reply: Morality, Humanity, and 
Historicality") address the question of whether a morality's emphasis 
on guilt is infantile, an indication that the morality is narrowly con-
ceived. Gaita argues that when one feels guilt when one harms anoth-
er, it is not merely a psychological result of comprehending the harm, 
but is essential to what it means to truly understand that one has 
wronged another. This occurs because there is an aspect to human 
beings which is sacred. That is, one recognizes the absolute value of 
human persons. Although Gaita knows that the concept of the sacred 
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has its origin in religion, he wants to maintain its legitimacy apart from 
its historical genesis. 
In his reply, Schacht asserts that absolute value (and absolute 
worth), which Gaita wants to uphold even without its religious 
grounding, is dependent on such a metaphysical foundation and 
without it must be abandoned. But this is no reason to despair, 
writes Schacht, for "the demise of such a conception of morality is no 
more tantamount to the end of all normativity than the death of God 
spells the end of all religion; for the former is as inseparable from all 
enhancement of life as the latter is wedded to its affirmation, when 
reconceived as its celebration." (55). Instead of the "nihilistic end of 
morality and religion," the passing of infantile morality, Schacht main-
tains, may result in religion's and morality's-"and our-coming of 
age." (55). To this reviewer's disappointment, however, Schacht does 
not show how morality can be grounded if its metaphysical foundations 
have been jettisoned. 
In part II, authors Robert Adams ("The Concept of a Divine 
Command") and Clark A. Kucheman ("Reply: Moral Duty and God: A 
View from the Left") deal with the issue of morality and divine com-
mands. Adams is not committed to the first half of the Euthyphro dilem-
ma, something is good because God loves it. He is not arguing that good-
ness is grounded in God's commands, but rather, some of our obliga-
tions to do what is good are found in the commands of God known by 
special revelation. He works this out with great analytical skill, 
addressing objections as well as admitting the shortcomings of his view. 
Although he, like Adams, seeks an objective ground for morality, 
Kucheman argues for a version of Kant's categorical imperative. 
Instead of divine commands, Kucheman's moral precepts are 
derived from "my self-imposed fundamental moral duty to treat free 
Ts, bearers of spirit, including first of all myself, always as free Ts, 
bearers of spirit, and never as unfree 'its'." (97). For Kucheman, this 
means that allegiance to God would conflict with one's moral duty. 
Writes Kucheman: 
Since ultimate allegiance to anything whatever that is external to me 
as an "I" entails freely deciding to decide what to believe theoreti-
cally and what to do practically un freely, that is, by a "het-
eronomous subjection of the will", and so treating myself as an 
unfree "it" rather than as a free "I", I (and all other "I" s) ought as a 
matter of moral duty not to be ultimately allegiant to this sover-
eignly-willing creator. (97) 
It is no revelation to conclude that an autonomous neo-Kantian 
would not find moral a universe created by the Christian God who 
makes demands that may conflict with the neo-Kantian's autonomy. 
But why should the Christian who is not neo-Kantian (perhaps she 
holds to a rich Thomistic view of natural law) have to conclude from 
this that the neo-Kantian is right after all? Could not the Christian 
conclude that since the Christian God does exist and has revealed him-
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self both in Scripture and in nature that neo-Kantianism is simply 
wrong? 
Take, for example, the question of whether the state ought to 
permit same-sex marriage. Although I do not know Kucheman's 
views on this issue, it seems Kucheman would argue that to say that 
such an institution is immoral and violates natural law (as well as 
Scripture) and thus ought to be prohibited would be to violate the 
autonomy of those of the same gender who want to consummate their 
love in the trappings of a lawful union. However, this seems to beg the 
question, at least in the minds of those who oppose such unions, for the 
appeal to autonomy as the basis for moral action seems to assume a 
metaphysical position that affirms that all traditional notions about 
gender, marriage, and family are phenomena that are the result of 
artificial social institutions rather than the result of an immutable 
human nature endowed to us by either God or Nature. On the 
other hand, those who oppose same-sex marriage maintain that 
autonomy and consent are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions 
for an act to be legally or morally permissible and traditional notions 
of gender, marriage, and family, however differently expressed 
throughout human history and/or better understood as the result of 
moral reflection, are part of the furniture of the universe and are such 
that their continued existence is essential to maintaining the moral 
ecology of human society. Understood in these terms, a neo-Kantian 
analysis of the moral permissibility of certain institutions, divorced from 
metaphysical considerations, seems empty.2 
Part III concerns the problem of evil. Marilyn McCord Adams 
("Evil and the God-Who-Does-Nothing-In-Particular") argues that 
some type of theodicy is necessary if the problem of evil is to be ade-
quately resolved. Adams maintains that free will defenses proposed by 
certain analytic philosophers of religion simply do not work since there is 
just too much gratuitous and apparently unnecessary evil in the world. 
According to Adams, we need a theodicy that is capable of making 
sense out of a world full of horrendous evils that result in human suffer-
ing. We need a theodicy that can give coherent meaning to lives that 
seem like a series of unconnected parts. In his reply, Rowan Williams 
("Reply: Redeeming Sorrows") is not satisfied with Adams' direction. 
He maintains that since there is an incommensurability between our 
experiences of suffering and God, "even the best and subtlest of 
theodicies cannot but seem a strategy for evading most of this" (148). 
In other words, attempts at reconciling "God's ways" with "our suffer-
ing" do not fully capture either the divine or the human. 
In part IV, authors Philip L. Quinn ("Relativism and Torture: 
Religious and Secular Responses") and Joseph Runzo ("Reply: Ethical 
Universality and Ethical Relativism") deal with the question of whether 
it is possible to make philosophically justified moral prescriptions that 
are applicable in all times, all places, and all people. In order to 
answer this question, Quinn and Runzo critically discuss the moral 
prohibition against torture, which many ethicists would claim is a uni-
versal moral prescription. Quinn believes that the wrongness of torture 
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is based on a prima facie moral duty that cannot be overriden. In order 
to defend this position, according to Quinn, one may argue that tor-
ture is wrong because human beings are made in the image of God. 
However, this will not do the trick for those who deny that human 
beings possess such a property. Some are atheists who believe that 
torture is wrong for other reasons. And some are people (including 
atheists and theists) who simply believe that torture, although prima 
facie wrong, is sometimes permissible. Although people, such as 
Quinn, who believe that torture is always wrong consider themselves 
justified in having that belief, they need not, according to Quinn, "and 
for charity'S sake probably should not, deny that [their] opponents are 
also justified in believing that torture is not always wrong" (155). This 
conclusion is the result of Quinn's epistemology: "after all, being justi-
fied is a contextual affair .... Epistemic relativism with respect to being 
justified seems close to being undeniable" (155). 
Runzo seems to agree with Quinn that there are no secular or reli-
gious arguments that would convince everyone that torture ought to be 
prohibited. However, Runzo still wants to say that torture is univer-
sally wrong. To put it another way: "Morality is relative, yet the 
wrongness of torture is universal" (186). In order to resolve this 
apparent contradiction, Runzo maintains that "there may be overlap-
ping but different world-views which provide different supporting con-
ceptions of why one should never employ torture if one is to act in a 
way that respects others as persons. Indeed, we would expect variant 
arguments to support this prohibition on torture even within any secu-
lar or religious tradition" (185). 
Part V consists of two very interesting articles-one by Jack V. 
Canfield ("Ethics Post-Zen") and the other by Frank J. Hoffman 
("Reply: Before 'Post-Zen': A Discussion of Buddhist Ethics")-which 
discuss questions concerning the relationship between Zen Buddhist 
ethics and its notion of the self. Since Western philosophers have done 
so little work integrating their philosophical interests with non-
Western modes of thought, these two pieces are quite helpful. 
The question of whether religion is the basis for morality is the 
focus of Part VI. KW. Beardsmore ("Atheism and Morality") argues 
that moral concepts are not dependent on religion, although he main-
tains that there is something unique to religion for which morality has 
no analogue. He admits that it is wrong that religion has been treated 
condescendingly by some atheists, but he also points out that atheism 
has been a victim of that posture as well. He argues, among other 
things, that even though much of moral language is rooted in reli-
gion, moral concepts can survive the demise of a religious context. It 
seems to me, however, that Beardsmore does not adequately address 
the question of the ontological grounding of moral claims. Certainly 
Beardsmore is right that one can be a good atheist and also employ 
moral language divorced from its conceptual roots. But that is a far cry 
from answering the ontological question: Can atheism ground the 
Good? Perhaps one way to deal with this is to defend moral construc-
tivism (e.g., Rawls' theory of justice) and deny moral realism, since the 
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former seems to fit better in atheistic discourse. Fair enough, but this 
results in moral concepts not having the same meaning as they do in 
theistic discourse.3 In reply to Beardsmore, James Conant ("Reply: 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Anscombe on Moral Unintelligibility") 
gives a careful analysis of the way three very different philosophers 
have answered the question of whether one can divorce morality from 
religion without losing morality's intelligibility. 
There are so many important insights in and aspects to the papers in 
this book that 1 cannot possibly mention them all in this brief review. 
This is an outstanding collection and an important contribution to the 
ongoing discussion about the relationship between morality and reli-
gion. I highly recommend this book to graduate students as well as 
professors of philosophy, theology, and religious studies. 
NOTES 
1. See, for example, Janine Marie Idziak, "In Search of 'Good 
Positive Reasons' for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of 
Arguments," in Readings In Christian Ethics, Volume 1: Theory and Method, 
eds. David K. Clark and Robert V. Rakestraw (Grand Rapids: Baker Book 
House, 1994), 50-61. 
2. Some political philosophers in the Kantian tradition, such as John 
Rawls, believe such a divorce between metaphysics and politics is essen-
tial to a just regime. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993). For a discussion of this question by two 
Christian philosophers, see Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion 
in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 
3. See George 1. Mavrodes, "Religion and the Queerness of 
Morality," in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Committment, eds. Robert 
Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1986); and J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist?: The Debate 
Between Theists and Atheists (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 97-135. 
Olltological Arguments and Belief in Cod, by Graham Oppy. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. Pp. xviii, 376. $59.95 (Cloth) 
ROBERT OAKES, Saint Louis University 
Professor Oppy's ambitious book may well provide the most compre-
hensive coverage of ontological arguments that can be found to date. It 
is hard to identify another book on the topic which constitutes as rich 
and extensive a source for such arguments. Oppy has managed to pull 
together a remarkable wealth of material, and it seems a safe bet that 
there is no type of ontological argument developed thus far that is wor-
thy of philosophical note but not presented and carefully assessed in this 
text. Thus, what we have here is arguably nothing short of an intellectu-
al Feast of St. Anselm. Oppy discusses (these are his categorizations) 
Definitional arguments, Conceptual arguments, Modal arguments' 
